Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics [Versión Kindle]

This book wants to make the case for the creation of a systematic philosophical framework called "somaesthetics", which Shusterman defines as "the critical meliorative study of one's experience and use of one's body as a locus of sensory aesthetic appreciation (aesthesis) and creative self-fashioning." His main concern seems to be about philosophers as such. Persons who pursue that activity traditionally disregard the body as a subject for reflection, and S wants to correct that bias.

Therefore he has made a commentary on the "somatic theorizing" of six major western philosophers of the twentieth century (extending back into the late nineteenth century for William James): Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, Ludwig Wittgenstein, James, and John Dewey. He has chosen his subjects for their general eminence and the fact that they represent six different "schools" of twentieth century philosophy.

So he finds that all six subject do engage in somatic theorizing, some much more than others (e.g., James much more than Wittgenstein), and that none of this eminent theorizing is sufficient to ground a viable "somaesthetics".

So, he has made two points: (1) eminent philosophers do engage in somatic theorizing, and (2) there is at this time no philosopher who has provided a systematic framework for this critical meliorative study of the body.

So he concludes that philosophy still has work to do on this project. There are indeed efforts towards that end, but no dominant model, and so "our toolbox of somatic disciplines must be pluralistic." He makes a kind of excuse for the failure of philosophers to construct a somaesthetics by observing, "We can't reflect on everything..." and that raises an important issue.

None of the six philosophers Shusterman studies had access to a particular area of information about the body that we now know to be absolutely critical for understanding how we human beings form thoughts and behavior. That area we might call "deep biochemistry".

Deep biochemistry includes somatic elements such as neuroprocessors and hormones, the effects of stress (especially early childhood stress), triggering trauma imprints, medical pharmaceuticals. (the most used antidepressants are selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors, i.e., they regulate bodily chemicals), cross-cultural pharmaceuticals (e.g., peyote and mushrooms). It also includes the varieties of "mindfulness", since mindfulness itself is simply the entry into the ante-chamber of non-conscious psychosomatic processes, and leaves significant choices to be made. For example, scientology and psychoanalysis are radically different in their methods of introspection; yoga's ultimate conclusion is that the body is illusory; there are a least three radically different forms of religions meditation: Hindu concentration, Buddhist vipassana, and Christian use of texts and images; and there is a form of somatic introspection recently developed as psychotherapy by Hakomi ("inner body sensing") and The Focusing Institute (Gendlin--"the felt sense").

Deep biochemistry probably starts with Abram Kardiner's study of "combat neurosis" during World War I, and developes slowly throughout the course of the twentieth century. PTSD is only medically recognized in 1981, and the work on the actual biochemical functioning of trauma is still in progress.

The study of deep biochemistry has revealed to us the phenomenon of "dissociation", a disorganization of thought and behavior due to long-lasting alterations in the regulation of endogenous opioids (endorphins) by the overwhelm of the body's natural survival mechanisms.

How important is the discovery of dissociation? Well, just consider the fact that the Taliban on the one hand and suicide bombers on the other are classic cases of it. One absolutely has to be "out of one's body" to adopt the practices they use.

So it seems that a somaesthetic agenda that includes the study of deep biochemistry would indeed be a valuable addition to contemporary philosophy.

One consequence of phenomenology's struggle to overcome the subject-object distinction has been an increased interest in the conception of the human body and its place in the larger, and equally physical, world. Shusterman's exploration of some of the traditional, as well as phenomenological, analyses of that problematic, while very readable, is also plagued by its commitment to such traditional notions as the mind-body dualism.

That relates to his intent to be helpful to us non-philosopher type ordinary folk. As an advocate of such body therapies as the Alexander Technique and Feldenkrais Method, he leans heavily and steadily in the direction of how-to-improve-ourselves. One cannot doubt the virtue of such therapeutic intentions. Yet one can doubt the value of such when used to critique philosophers, such as Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, specifically identified with a breakaway from the Platonic tradition of mind over matter.

That is not to say that the issues at stake of habit, will, choice, behavior are easily answered. In the concluding chapter comparing James and Dewey, the unresolved conflicts are examined. Shusterman's desire for self-improvement appears in his description of the James/Dewey differences with "Dewey's reconstruction of James's theory of emotion corrects this anomalous suggestion of a pure spiritual, bodiless emotion that would imply a real division of mind from body."

The late Donald Davidson outlined his theory of "anomalous monism" in pursuit of a comprehensive understanding of the inescapable conflict. So one legitimate way to avoid double-talk is to accept a doubled unity. It represents our inherited analytic pattern of breaking unities into pieces and then looking for some glue, because we know they ought not to have been separated to begin with. James struggled with that, and it is what Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein advocate.

A philosophically responsible phenomenological contribution to personal therapy, while far from unknown, is yet far from popular. The "Journal of Phenomenological Psychology" has been published for 40 years, so its Google hits numbering a mere 140,000 shows its limited attraction. Yet it marks a prominent place where philosophy and psychology represent their differences. Kant first asked, Which had priority, the body or the mind? Later he admitted that was undetermined. As his primary interest was a philosophical critique, his disdain of psychology followed.

Shusterman offers a competent encounter with his choice of philosophers. His defensive preference for traditional conceptualizations in the name of philosophy of mind, while disappointing, does not negate the value of his contribution. Who else dares to take on Foucault, de Beauvoir, Dewey and Wm. James, along with Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in one grand philosophical (psychological?) struggle?

Shusterman's book remains ruled by its prior psychological commitments, but it may provide a springboard to further discussions of those philosophers, as well as to a better understanding of the body in philosophy of mind.

A tendentious book exhibiting questionable scholarship. Any work purporting to discuss the philosophical issues raised by the so-called mind-body problem should take account of current work in brain research and cognitive studies. Shusterman cites Lakoff, Johnson, Dennet, and Damasio among others, but gives little evidence that he has seriously engaged with their ideas. His citations are all pre-1999, a serious lacuna in a field developing as fast as cognitive science.

Similarly, Shusterman's extensive but eventually dismissive discussion of John Dewey and F.M. Alexander quotes admittedly problematic passages from Alexander's earliest book (1918), but largely ignores both Alexander's later work and further developments arising from his discoveries. He cites Frank Pierce Jones's book Body Awareness in Action, but ignores the research it describes. He dismisses the fact that Dewey's support of Alexander was derived mostly from Dewey's direct experience of his teaching, not from his writings. Shusterman mentions that he has taken a few Alexander lessons himself. Speaking as an Alexander teacher of forty years' experience I can state with some authority that this book suggests that he has fundamentally misunderstood what Alexander discovered.

I am not qualified to evaluate Shusterman's ideas about the four other philosophers whom he discusses, but if the problems I describe above are typical, it would be better to turn elsewhere for insights in this field.

William Conable, Professor Emeritus
The Ohio State University