Crumpton's expertise and dedication cannot be questioned. The subtitle, though, is more descriptive of the book than the main title. This is not a treatise on The Art of Intelligence. It is, however, about the experience of one CIA officer and team leader, at least to the extent he can discuss his experiences.
What I found most interesting was Chapter 7, about the differences between the approaches and limitations of the CIA versus the FBI. Crumpton is impatient with political leaders who demand more solid proof than his team would need to take drastic action. He is impatient with those who collect evidence instead of "intelligence," which is often a lower standard. He is impatient with the need to justify and to obtain permission when the mission is clear and the available intelligence seems to point to a resolution clear to the CIA.
One thing bothers me about Crumpton's conclusions, in which he seems to be surprised a "how ambivalent, cynical, or ignorant the U.S. public and many policy makers are about intelligence." Really? With an organization that is essentially a secret, with a fairly large budget that is just as largely unaccounted for; with the "I can't tell you where I work or what I do" and "the CIA is necessary, but we can't tell you how or why" constraints (some of which are clearly necessary), it seems not very surprising to me. People - whether members of Congress or the public - tend to distrust what they do not understand, and what will not be explained to them. To suggest that ambivalence, cynicism and ignorance are incredible, is massively naive.
I would rather that the book lived up to its main title - a more in-depth description of the hows and whys of intelligence - instead of "Henry Crumpton's Experience with the CIA." As for historical context, Crumpton could have spent more time on how the CIA was used, despite its actual advice, to help justify the Iraq war, for example.
Still, an interesting book which answers, at least in part, some of the essential questions and discusses the seemingly insurmountable problems and the ways in which the CIA is trying to adapt and to overcome those obstacles.