- Tapa blanda: 527 páginas
- Editor: Vintage Books; Edición: Reprint (1 de noviembre de 2007)
- Colección: Vintage
- Idioma: Inglés
- ISBN-10: 0375724915
- ISBN-13: 978-0375724916
- Valoración media de los clientes: Sé el primero en opinar sobre este producto
- Clasificación en los más vendidos de Amazon: nº1.017.260 en Libros en idiomas extranjeros (Ver el Top 100 en Libros en idiomas extranjeros)
Compara Precios en Amazon
+ Envío GRATIS
Dangerous Nation: America's Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century (Vintage) (Inglés) Tapa blanda – 1 nov 2007
Descripción del producto
"Brilliant and original. . . . A tour de force of historical writing that should change the way many people view the country's past. . . a landmark." --Foreign Affairs"The most important reassessment of early United States foreign policy to appear in over half a century. Compellingly written and provocatively argued, it goes far toward explaining -- to the world but also to ourselves -- who we Americans are today, and where we may be going." --John Lewis Gaddis, author of The Cold War"A first-rate work of history, based on prodigious reading and enlivened by a powerful prose style. . . . Helps bring long-dead diplomatic history to life."--The Economist"Provocative and deeply absorbing. . . . [Kagan] shows how America was always a player, and often a ruthless one, in the great game of nations."--The New York Times Book Review
Reseña del editor
The best-selling author of
No es necesario ningún dispositivo Kindle. Descárgate una de las apps de Kindle gratuitas para comenzar a leer libros Kindle en tu smartphone, tablet u ordenador.
Obtén la app gratuita:
Detalles del producto
Si eres el vendedor de este producto, ¿te gustaría sugerir ciertos cambios a través del servicio de atención al vendedor?
Opiniones de clientes
|5 estrellas (0%)|
|4 estrellas (0%)|
|3 estrellas (0%)|
|2 estrellas (0%)|
|1 estrella (0%)|
Opiniones de clientes más útiles en Amazon.com
In "Dangerous Nation," historian Robert Kagan delivers up a sweeping, and somewhat iconoclastic, history of American foreign policy from before the Founding right up to the outbreak of the Spanish American War. (This is the first, in a two-volume set. The second volume presumably covering the Spanish American War to the present day.)
Many histories of U.S. Foreign policy have been written. Where Kagan does an invaluable service is in providing contrary evidence to the now standard claim that the United States was, for the first 150 years, an essentially isolationist nation removed from world affairs. This was never the case, unless one were to conclude that America's interactions with European nations and new Latin American republics during our continental expansion were somehow "domestic" policy.
Kagan also does an excellent job of demolishing the myth that idealism in U.S. Foreign policy is some sort of new idea that began with the neo-conservative "takeover" of the Bush administration. In fact, for good or for ill, U.S. foreign policy has always been largely, perhaps even primarily motivated by concern for the spread of our republican political system and the universalist principles concerning Liberty set forth in the Declaration of Independence. This often came at the expense of more prosaic concerns to the chagrin and utter confusion of the European powers with which we dueled throughout the 19th century. Kagan maintains that the driving force behind much of U.S. foreign policy throughout the early to mid-19th century was concerned with checking the forces of reaction in Europe, as absolutist monarchs, horrified by the spread of republicanism, consolidated their power and sought to expand their influence in the new world.
To the extent that the U.S. did maintain a hands off approach to foreign policy in the early to mid 19th century, Kagan argues this was largely due to the domestic political question of slavery. It has become fashionable for the public to dismiss slavery as a secondary cause of the civil war in favor of other material issues (northern desire to economically dominate the south, federalism/state's rights, etc.) Nothing could be farther from the case. Throughout the 19th century, slavery was *the* dominant issue leading up to the Civil War. Kagan provides important insight into how the slavery question deformed every important political decision during that time period, both in foreign and domestic policy. To some extent, the U.S. did curtail its pursuit of the expansion of the "American System" because the dominant political culture of the South feared a stronger federal government that could limit and eventually abolish slavery.
Although the South did favor expansion into the Caribbean or Mexico in order to create a "slave empire," for the most part, Southern fears of the "American System" (in which, they realized, lay the seeds of the destruction of their way of life) worked to block any move away from the status quo. Northerners blocked expansion into Cuba and Santa Domingo because they feared the expansion of slavery. Southerners blocked settlement on the issues of Oregon, California and the Nebraska territories for the opposite reasons. Texas became an independent republic, not because they didn't want to join the Union, but rather because the Union couldn't figure out how to assimilate it. Settlement of even the original Louisiana purchase was fraught with peril because every question that arose had to answered in the light of the one issue no one could solve.
For the insights on the slavery issue alone and how it deformed American politics from 1820 to 1860, "Dangerous Nation" is worth reading. But more so readers will enjoy the large scope of Kagan's work and, more importantly, gain a critical understanding of just how Americans' view of themselves in the world (as the main proponents of republicanism and Liberty, the "...last, best hope of Man.") has influenced our relations with the outside world from the very beginning of the Republic.
Kagan makes some great points about U.S. expansion despite our national belief of the opposite. His writing in this volume (which ends at the Spanish-American War, with a second to follow on the 20th Century) is erudite. Often, however, the reader is led astray and wonders where the author is going - and the answer is really nowhere, simply making sometimes quite long winded comments that are off message. In essence, Kagan is a brilliant thinker, has a very sustainable premise but is only an adequate writer. A book for those highly interested in a fairly radical view of American foreign policy, over a long period of time.
The author does not rebuff the allegations, that the desire for personal profit had played a role in every acquisition of new American territory. But he adds, that American expansionism was possible first and foremost by attraction, based on a superior political and economic system and only then by force of arms. "American global influence need not depend on the perpetual mlitary subjugation of overseas colonies. While the use of force might sometimes be necessary to gain American traiders equal access to foreign markets, America's real and lasting influence would come through the power of trade itself".
At the end of the 19th century the United States declares war on Spain, however. A signifcant reason for that, was awareness that the continuation of the Cuban Civil war included the total destruction of American property and investments. But as the author puts it, although those were important considerations, for President McKinley they were secondary to the humanitarian crisis. Robert Kagan mentions that some historians are insisting that the humanitarian concerns in this case were just a cover for selfish economic interests, while most American historians had been baffled that the United States had gone to war for abstract reasons.
Interesting enough, to read the whole book, was to find out that President Grant, in his second inaugural address, expressed his conviction that "our great Maker is preparing the world, in His own good time, to become one nation, speaking one language". The author adds to that, that most of Americans at that time believed, that all nations are treading the same path to become civilized; some faster, some slower. Today, this acknowledgement appears to have outlived glory days; it is modern to discuss cultural diversity. The question, therefore, is whether American world expansion in the 21st century is as inevitable as the expansion in the Western hemisphere during the 18th and 19th centuries? Perhaps Robert Kagan will tell us about that in his next book.