- Tapa blanda: 584 páginas
- Editor: Harvard University Press; Edición: New Ed (1 de agosto de 1997)
- Idioma: Inglés
- ISBN-10: 0674341163
- ISBN-13: 978-0674341166
- Valoración media de los clientes: Sé el primero en opinar sobre este producto
- Clasificación en los más vendidos de Amazon: nº187.133 en Libros en idiomas extranjeros (Ver el Top 100 en Libros en idiomas extranjeros)
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Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Inglés) Tapa blanda – ago 1997
Descripción del producto
In a clear, Myersonian writing style, this book systematically describes our state-of-the-art knowledge of game theory. Written as an introductory text, it looks at the subject from the viewpoint of a newcomer to the field, beginning with utility theory and arriving at the most sophisticated ideas discussed today. Myerson not only gives complete mathematical statements and proofs, but also supplies the intuitive arguments that motivate them...Because of its comprehensiveness, researchers and users of game theory can find descriptions of almost all special game theoretic topics and issues presented in "user friendly" style...It is very likely that Myerson's Game Theory will remain the main introductory text for many years to come. -- Ehud Kalai Games and Economic Behavior Exposing an applied mathematics field on a basic level poses a challenge to an author, namely, to find the proper mix of displaying the models, providing the motivation and presenting the mathematical results and derivations. This is even more true in a field like game theory, where the models are not universally acceptable as adequately depicting real applications. The author, in the text under review, is doing remarkably well. The models are displayed with enough details and explanations to generate motivation even in newcomers to the field...All in all, it is a very good elaborate introduction to game theory. -- Zvi Artstein Mathematical Reviews Myerson provides a good introduction to game theory, focusing on the 'generality and unity of game theory' rather than on its extensive applications. After a brief overview of Bayesian decision theory, noncooperative and cooperative models of games are explored in the context of their solutions, results, and guiding methodological principles. The relative merits of the extensive form and the strategic form of a game are illustrated, which lead naturally into an analysis of equilibria for each representation. Special extensions are discussed, including games with communication, repeated games, and noncooperative games that introduce the elements of bargaining and coalitions...The book has interesting and challenging problem sets for each chapter as well as a bibliography for students who want to study in more depth specific topics in game theory. Choice A very well-written introduction to game theory. American Mathematical Monthly
Reseña del editor
Roger Myerson's introductory text aims to provide a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of nonco-operative and co-operative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the advances made in the subject over the past 15 years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models. Written as an introductory text, it looks at the subject from the viewpoint of a newcomer to the field, beginning with utility theory and arriving at the most sophisticated ideas discussed today.Ver Descripción del producto
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I didn't read the entire book, but only the first 400 pages, so I don't hold the best position to evaluate this book compared to some readers here, with had almost memorized the book for their game theory courses. But I think that I am still qualified enough to talk about some details of the first 7 chapters of the book. One with left me a bit puzzled: Myerson said that the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem converges in the limit to the competitive equilibrium type of efficiency when the number of players is multiplied, or at least argues that modern game theory helps to explain how such equilibrium can be reached, that is true, but his example is not adequate for this argument because competitive general equilibrium has some very important differences from a trading mechanism involving units of indivisible goods with infinite players. In this case (the mechanism) we have efficiency because a continuum of players of the same set of types makes a probability distribution of valuation turn into a certainty about the valuation of the group of individuals. The classical general equilibrium case is demonstrated by game theory as an special case of cooperative games with perfect information, divisible goods and an infinite number of players of each type, where are allocation that is not consistent with classical GE is outside the core. So, his comparison in that section is really incorrect: There is no direct connection between classical GE and that type of mechanism design problem.
But other than this case, I couldn't find any flaws in the book and the clarity of "Myersonian writing" is good enough for me. Also, the math is not very advanced, but requires a good grasp of calculus and linear algebra, with many undergraduate students don't have.