- Tapa dura: 402 páginas
- Editor: Alfred a Knopf (11 de febrero de 2014)
- Idioma: Inglés
- ISBN-10: 0307268179
- ISBN-13: 978-0307268174
- Valoración media de los clientes: Sé el primero en opinar sobre este producto
- Clasificación en los más vendidos de Amazon: nº491.328 en Libros en idiomas extranjeros (Ver el Top 100 en Libros en idiomas extranjeros)
Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama (Inglés) Tapa dura – 11 feb 2014
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Reseña del editor
From a writer with long and high-level experience in the U.S. government, a startling and provocative assessment of Americas global dominance.Maximalist puts the history of our foreign policy in an unexpected new light, while drawing fresh, compelling lessons for the present and future.
When the United States has succeeded in the world, Stephen Sestanovich argues, it has done so not by staying the course but by having to change itusually amid deep controversy and uncertainty. For decades, the United States has been a power like no other. Yet presidents and policy makers worry that theyand, even more, their predecessorshavent gotten things right. Other nations, they say to themselves, contribute little to meeting common challenges. International institutions work badly. An effective foreign policy costs too much. Public support is shaky. Even the greatest successes often didnt feel that way at the time.
Sestanovich explores the dramatic results of American global primacy built on these anxious foundations, recounting cycles of overcommitment and underperformance, highs of achievement and confidence followed by lows of doubt. We may think there was a time when Americas international role reflected bipartisan unity, policy continuity, and a unique ability to work with others, butMaximalist tells a different storyone of divided administrations and divisive decision making, of clashes with friends and allies, of regular attempts to set a new direction. Doing too much has always been followed by doing too little, and vice versa.
Maximalist unearths the backroom stories and personalities that bring American foreign policy to life. Who knew how hard Lyndon Johnson fought to stay out of the war in Vietnamor how often Henry Kissinger ridiculed the idea of visiting China? Who remembers that George Bush Sr. found Ronald Reagans diplomacy too passiveor that Bush Jr. considered Bill Clintons too active? Leaders and scoundrels alike emerge from this retelling in sharper focus than ever before. Sestanovich finds lessons in the past that anticipate and clarify our chaotic present.
Biografía del autor
Stephen Sestanovich served as U.S. ambassador-at-large to the former Soviet Union during the Clinton administration, as a senior staff member at the National Security Council and the State Department during the Reagan administration, and as senior legislative assistant to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He is currently the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Diplomacy at Columbia Universitys School of International and Public Affairs, and the George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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What the author makes apparent is that most all administration made serious errors in judgment and I sometimes wondered how the country has survived the continuous streams of administrations who made so many, sometimes enormous, errors in judgment in foreign affairs. Johnson going maximalist in Viet Nam and George W Bush trying to take over Iraq on the cheap with no real strategy for occupation. All of the administrations were made up of supposedly brilliant and learned men, yet all made often catastrophic mistakes.
The author is pretty even handed in his criticism of both political parties.
He shows how momentum and internal politics can often have a major effect on the goals of a president--often overriding or subverting it.
Well worth reading!