- Tapa blanda: 288 páginas
- Editor: W W Norton & Co Inc; Edición: Reprint (1 de noviembre de 2003)
- Idioma: Inglés
- ISBN-10: 0393323714
- ISBN-13: 978-0393323719
- Valoración media de los clientes: Sé el primero en opinar sobre este producto
- Clasificación en los más vendidos de Amazon: nº421.474 en Libros en idiomas extranjeros (Ver el Top 100 en Libros en idiomas extranjeros)
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Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets (Inglés) Tapa blanda – nov 2003
Descripción del producto
"There could be no better guide to the modern view of markets than John McMillan's book." -- Joseph E. Stiglitz, Nobel prize winner in economics
Reseña del editor
From the wild swings of the stock market to the online auctions of eBay to the unexpected twists of the world's post-Communist economies, markets have suddenly become quite visible. We now have occasion to ask, "What makes these institutions work? How important are they? How can we improve them?" Taking us on a lively tour of a world we once took for granted, John McMillan offers examples ranging from a camel trading fair in India to the $20 million per day Aalsmeer flower market in the Netherlands to the global trade in AIDS drugs. Eschewing ideology, he shows us that markets are neither magical nor immoral. Rather, they are powerful if imperfect tools, the best we've found for improving our living standards. A New York Times Notable Book.Ver Descripción del producto
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My interpretation of the name may be wrong, but the book certainly delivers a thorough and clear explanation of the forces within markets and the forces (especially government policy) that affect their formation and operation. It is with these characteristics in mind that I consider this book a much better introduction to economics than Freakonomics, for example, and a broader foundation to understanding markets than was given in Who Gets What and Why (although that's an excellent book).
(I will note here that the book does not focus on non-market economics central to understanding and managing common pooled and public goods such as those I often discuss here, but McMillan does provide contextual explanations of how markets can create negative externalities, cannot always regulate themselves, and so on.)
To give you a taste of the book, I will provide a brief comment or quotation for each chapter.
(1) The only natural economy: "The market is not omnipotent, omnipresent, or omniscient. It is a human invention with human imperfections. It does not necessarily work well. It does not work by magic, or, for that matter, by voodoo. It works through institutions, procedures, rules, and customs." McMillan's uses "natural" to point out how markets emerge from various behaviors while reflecting local conditions. You cannot make an artificial market unsuitable to those conditions just as you cannot prevent people from making a market to suit their needs.
(2) Triumphs of intelligence: Markets deliver incredible value with low effort by allowing people to trade, each to their own advantage.
He who can't pay dies: Supply goes to those with money, so poorer people are more likely to die. This is not a fault of the market, which is efficient in a way, but a sign that governments need to get involved to help poor people (most usefully by giving them money; most harmfully by controlling prices of goods such as water, housing, or medical care).
(3) Information wants to be free: Competition reveals information about buyers and sellers, goods and services, and more information leads to better outcomes. (Regulation can lead to misleading information, as when industry "helps" draft regulations. The contents of gasoline and food are both regulated, but gas prices provide good information while food labels are misleading.)
Honesty is the best policy: Repeated transactions build reputations that help honest market participants (e.g., fake reviews on Amazon, credit scores, branding, etc.)
(4) To the best bidder & Come bid!: Auctions match the cheapest supply to the most valued demand. McMillan was involved in the pathbreaking auctions of radio frequency spectrum, which have raised $billions for governments. (He points out that governments have cost taxpayers $billions by giving spectrum to political friends.)
(5) When you work for yourself: Property rights give owners an incentive to be more efficient and discover value. The Soviet Union's model of "something that belongs to everyone belongs to no one" fits in here, as does the lack of "ownership" in the environmental commons that results in water pollution and GHG emissions driving climate change.
(6) The embarrassment of a patent: Intellectual property rights can help but they can harmful if they are too strong. (Listen to this podcast on pharmaceutical patents, for example.) China's Pearl River Delta region may overtake Silicon Valley as the latter's increasing reliance on patents interferes with innovation.
(7) No man is an island: Negative externalities from pollution, market power, etc. inhibit efficiency. McMillan ends this chapter with: "A workable platform for markets has five elements: information flows smoothly; people can be trusted to live up to their promises; competition is fostered; property rights are protected but not overprotected; and side effects on third parties are curtailed. For the remainder of the book I will look at how these five elements of market design get to be implemented -- or fail to be." (P135)
(8) In the next chapter (A conspiracy against the public) he says: "An intrinsic tension exists between the state and market. On occasions it becomes unhinged. The government has an essential role to play in designing markets. But intervention in markets has a downside, for governments cannot necessarily be relied up on to act as they should.... Government officials sometimes obstruct markets and profit from them by extorting bribes. They also on occasion help favored market participants to conspire against the public." Those last two sentences capture the essence of corruption ("abuse of public office for private gain"), which can involve stealing money but also promoting one's personal beliefs of what is "good" over what actually helps people. In the case of water, this includes charging too little for scarce water or system maintenance.
(9) Grassroots effort: A recap of the ideas best expressed in Hayek's 1945 paper, i.e., prices make it easy for disaggregated, uncoordinated participants to coordinate in a bottom-up manner that is faster and more efficient than in any top-down regime.
Managers of other people's money: A recap of the ideas expressed in Coase 1937, i.e., the "boundaries between a firm and the market are determined by transaction costs." Corporations do not rely on prices to play a big role in markets because they reflect command and control management. They tend to do well when there are profits to be won or lost in competition with other corporations, but they fail when they are left to authoritarian devices...
(10) A new era of competition: Governments can create markets for goods such as pollution or spectrum. These markets will work (or fail) in accordance with the design's accuracy and completeness. McMillan describes how the US market for SOx worked, but California's wholesale energy market failed (taking down the governor with it).
(11) Coming up for air: Governments can suppress or create markets (e.g., Russia's 1990s shock therapy), but excessive speed may hinder participants and institutions from learning how to use markets, thereby undermining and destabilizing their function.
(12) Antipoverty warriors: "Poverty cannot be eliminated by sharing the wealth" (p 213), but growth must reduce inequality if it's to be sustainable. We've seen many (well-deserved) protests on this issue. Anti-globalizationists are right to worry about unequal growth, but they need to attack politicians, not market participants, for that fault. It's possible (easy, actually) to transfer some of the gains of growth to losers...
(13) Market imperative: Markets can help a community but not if one group advances at the expense (or without regard) for another. Markets have an immense capacity to help us help each other... "as if guided by an invisible hand" but markets do not exist in a void. Good policies are necessary to help markets serve the community.
Bottom line: I give this book FIVE STARS for its clear and thorough discussion of how markets work (or fail) in human societies around the world. Read it if you want to really understand why economists are often so optimistic about human progress... and why those who are pessimistic focus on social and political failures.
Prof. McMillan devotes the first half of the book to what he identifies as the five basic components of market design: information flow, enforcement of promises, competition, property rights, and externalities. He devotes the second half of the book to implementation of those five basic components.
Overall, Prof. McMillan does a good job explaining economic concepts in plain English. Reinventing the Bazaar gets into a lot of the "guts" of markets that are typically not covered in basic economics classes. In particular, Prof. McMillan recognizes the importance of law and legal institutions to markets, something economists sometimes gloss over.
Unfortunately, Prof. McMillan has a tendency to make some rather questionable statements. For example, there is a rather blatant error (or omission) in his discussion of the preference of book agents' for sealed-bid auctions over open auctions (which net their clients higher advances). Prof. McMillan identifies the agents' position as "mistaken." But this preference is not due to mistake, it is due to agency costs. The agents are acting in their own self-interest in a scenario in which their interests conflict with those of their clients. Agents reap only a fraction of the benefit of the final bid, but perform the bulk of the extra legwork necessary to run a successful open auction (which also takes longer). This creates the divergence in interests.
Other statements look more like sloppiness than error. If it were true that the conventional wisdom is that "markets cannot exist without private ownership underpinned by the legal system," then the term "black market" would not exist and be in widespread use (Prof. McMillan claims this despite discussing the shadow economy a few chapters later). He states that "street vending has even gone global" as if it were invented in New York City a few decades ago and has not existed for thousands of years.
Inexplicably, Prof. McMillan fails to mention a grave error in U.S. spectrum auctions (which he apparently helped design) that allowed telecom companies to collude and buy spectrum for a fraction of its true value. By not forcing companies to bid only in large increments, the U.S. gave them an avenue to signal each other during the auction. Tim Harford covers this design flaw in chapter 7 of The Undercover Economist.
In his otherwise excellent discussion of tradeable emissions allowances, Prof. McMillan correctly notes that they only work if the total amount of pollution matters more than where it originates, but he fails to note in his implication that local pollution should be handled by government command-and-control action that local pollution is more susceptible to Coasian bargaining than national pollution due to lower transaction costs.
Prof. McMillan argues that government action is needed for effective markets (ordo-liberalism), and that is an important argument to make, but he fails to address its limitations. He recognizes that property rights are expensive to establish, for example, but any discussion of regulation without a discussion of regulatory capture is incomplete. Public choice theory is woefully absent, a fatal flaw for a book so concerned with designing efficient markets.
Reinventing the Bazaar is at its strongest when covering deregulation and privatization. Capitalism is clearly superior to command-and-control direction of the economy, but we have come to learn that even where there is an obviously better alternative, the transition itself can be problematic. Post-Soviet Union Russia is contrasted with China. Russia tried to used command-and-control methods to privatize its economy; China used more decentralized methods. Not surprisingly, China's efforts were more successful. I would remind advocates of deregulation and privatization that they are also government action and subject to the same limitations.
The final chapter puts things into a more political perspective. According to Prof. McMillan, neither free market and anti-market ideologues have an empirical leg to stand on. Where we come down in the middle must be determined by core values but, more importantly, also by the facts. I would add that this is good encouragement to look a little closer at the economic merits of public policy proposals (beyond what sponsoring politicians claim they are).
There are, I think, some fairly serious issues with Reinventing the Bazaar, which is why I gave it only 3 stars, but it is not without merit. It is probably as good a basic survey of economics for laymen as I have found (sadly, a largely disappointing sub-genre). I think it could still be an excellent choice if coupled with a survey of public choice, such as Gordon Tullock's Government Failure, to fill in its deficiencies.
It is a real pity that he passed away in March, 2007. Perhaps, if he were alive today and were inclined to update this book, he might have added a chapter on Google and its search/ads market place; maybe, even commented on the recent brouhaha surrounding on "Cap and Trade" systems (which have been installed to reduce carbon emissions but in turn might reduce growth!); and most important to me, he might have thrown in an analysis of the role of speculators in oil markets. But all of this is mere speculation on my part because Professor McMillan is no longer with us.
He spends the first half of the book exclusively on the five aspects that are needed for designing a market. They are:
1. Information must flow smoothly.
2. Competition must be fostered.
3. People who form the market must be honest and stand up to their end of the bargain.
4. Property rights must be protected but not overprotected.
5. Side effects on third parties must be reduced.
I've decided to commit these principles to memory as I design my market simulator.