- Tapa blanda: 272 páginas
- Editor: Harvard University Press; Edición: New Ed (15 de marzo de 1988)
- Idioma: Inglés
- ISBN-10: 0674843819
- ISBN-13: 978-0674843813
- Valoración media de los clientes: Sé el primero en opinar sobre este producto
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Inglés) Tapa blanda – 15 mar 1988
Descripción del producto
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge is important as a very lucid and perceptive treatment of the coherence/foundations controversy. Thorough and careful, it is also well conceived and well written and does not get lost in details. It should be of interest to philosophers of every persuasion.--Ernest Sosa, Brown University
Reseña del editor
How must our knowledge be systematically organized in order to justify our beliefs? There are two options--the solid securing of the ancient foundationalist pyramid or the risky adventure of the new coherentist raft. For the foundationalist like Descartes each piece of knowledge can be stacked to build a pyramid. Not so, argues BonJour. What looks like a pyramid is in fact a dead end, a blind alley. Better by far to choose the raft.Here BonJour sets out the most extensive antifoundationalist argument yet developed. The first part of the book offers a systematic exposition of foundationalist views and formulates a general argument to show that no variety of foundationalism provides an acceptable account of empirical justification. In the second part he explores a coherence theory of empirical knowledge and argues that a defensible theory must incorporate an adequate conception of observation. The book concludes with an account of the correspondence theory of empirical truth and an argument that systems of empirical belief which satisfy the coherentist standard of justification are also likely to be true.
No es necesario ningún dispositivo Kindle. Descárgate una de las apps de Kindle gratuitas para comenzar a leer libros Kindle en tu smartphone, tablet u ordenador.
Obtén la app gratuita:
Detalles del producto
Si eres el vendedor de este producto, ¿te gustaría sugerir ciertos cambios a través del servicio de atención al vendedor?
Opiniones de clientes
|5 estrellas (0%)|
|4 estrellas (0%)|
|3 estrellas (0%)|
|2 estrellas (0%)|
|1 estrella (0%)|
Opiniones de clientes más útiles en Amazon.com
His thesis is weaker than Brand Blanshard's; BonJour does not wish to defend a coherentist account of truth itself, nor a version of coherentism in which every fact is entailed by literally _every_ other.
In one important sense this is a strength rather than a weakness; it would be a shame if coherentism were simply _identified_ with its strongest version, for coherentism itself could then be summarily dismissed if its "strong" form failed.
On the other hand, in my own view BonJour devotes insufficient attention to the "strong" form, which I find more defensible than he does at least as a theoretical ideal. (He is right, though, that Blanshard's own account of "strong" coherentism requires a more detailed defense than Blanshard himself provided.)
At any rate, BonJour's work belongs on the shortlist of top philosophical works in the rationalist camp. Together with his _In Defense of Pure Reason_, it is required reading for anyone interested in understanding and defending the role of reason in philosophy and elsewhere.